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Constitutional theorists are familiar with
epistemic and consequentialist reasons why
judges might allow their decision making to
be shaped by strongly held public opinion. The
epistemic approach treats public opinion as an
expert indicator, while the consequentialist
approach counsels judges to compromise legally
correct interpretations so as not to antagonize a
hostile public. But there is also a third reason,
which we can think ofas constitutive. In limited
circumstances, the fact that the public strongly
holds a given view can be one of the factors
that together constitute the correct answer to a
constitutional question. In those circumstances,
what the public thinks must be an ingredient in
the judge's own view of the right answer.
Les thloriciens du droit constitutionnel
connaissent bien les raisons epistmiques
et consiquentialistes pour lesquelles un juge
permettrait h l'opinion publique fortement
ancrie d'influencer son processus dicisionnel.
Dansl 'pprocheepistlmique, l'opinionpublique
est considirle comme un indicateur expert,
tandis que dans l'approche consiquentialiste,
on conseille les juges de compromettre les
interpritations qui sont correctes d'un point
de vuejuridique afin d'iviter de contrarier un
public hostile. Ily a igalement une troisieme
raison, que nous pouvons considirer comme
itant constitutive. Dans certaines circonstances,
le fait que l'opinion publique soit solidement
ancrie peut itre un desfacteurs qui, ensemble,
constituent la bonne r.4ponse h une question
d'ordre constitutionnelle. Ce que pense le
public, dans de telles circonstances, doit itre un
des 1ldmentsformant l'opinion dujuge quant 4
la bonne riponse.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent essay, Cass Sunstein offers useful terms for distinguishing between
two reasons why judges might hesitate before ruling that constitutional law
requires a result that the public strongly opposes.' One reason is epistemic
and the other consequentialist. The epistemic reason, boiled down, is that if
Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. Thanks to Barry Friedman, Gil Seinfeld, and Scott
Shapiro.
1 Cass R. Sunstein, "If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?" (2007)
60 Stanford Law Rev. 155 [Sunstein].
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a large number of people believe a given view to be correct, one should think
hard before concluding that they are mistaken. The consequentialist reason,
also boiled down, is that even if a judicial ruling is legally correct, it could
still be unpopular enough to provoke a public backlash that would damage
both the specific cause served by the court's ruling and the general climate of
obedience to legal institutions.2 In this essay, I suggest that there is also a third
reason why some strongly held public views should figure in constitutional
adjudication. We can call this third alternative the constitutive reason.
The constitutive reason for considering public opinion is that the strongly
held view of the public is sometimes an ingredient of the right answer to
a constitutional question, just like text, precedent, history, structure, social
science, and normative theory. This constitutive reason differs from the
epistemic and consequentialist reasons. Unlike the epistemic reason, which
sees public opinion as a possible indicator of the legally correct answer, the
constitutive reason sees public opinion as a possible creator of that answer.
Unlike the consequentialist reason, which calls on judges to compromise what
they know to be the legally correct answer in light of extralegal considerations,
the constitutive reason calls on judges to pay attention to strong public opinion
as part of figuring out what the correct answer is in the first place. It is a factor
to be considered inside the process of constitutional reasoning, not an external
condition against which the result of such reasoning must be balanced.3
Another way to put the point is to say that strong public opinion is
sometimes a source of authority in constitutional law. Public opinion can be a
constitutive factor in constitutional reasoning, I suggest, for the same reason
that other sources of authority, like text and precedent, can be such factors:
in appropriate cases, treating it as a source of authority vindicates values that
2 Ibid.
3 It might seem that this position entails an infinite regress. If public opinion on a constitutional
issue is an input in constitutional interpretation, then people must know what public opinion
is on that issue before they can decide on the proper content of constitutional law- but until
people have a view of the proper content of constitutional law, there can be no public opinion
on the issue to be consulted. This problem would only arise, however, if public opinion on
constitutional issues were the product of reflective decision makers following a series of prescribed
analytical steps, one of which was the consultation of public opinion. It isn't. Perhaps my
suggestion would be self-contradictory if millions of citizens became self-conscious constitutional
interpreters at a level more reflective than is often achieved today by professional judges-and
academics, but it seems unlikely that that will happen. My contention that public opinion should
be considered an input in constitutional interpretation is addressed to reflective interpreters.
Because they are few, they can take broader public opinion as an input without triggering a
regress. On other limitations of the idea of the public's having views on constitutional issues, or
interpreters being able to discern those views, see infra Part III at 11-15.
Volume 13, Issue 1, 2007
HeinOnline  -- 13 Rev. Const. Stud. 2 2007-2008
Richard Primus
should shape constitutional decision making.4 Specifically, attention to the
views of the demos can enhance democratic autonomy, the rule of law, and the
legitimacy of the constitutional system.
One should not get carried away. Paying attention to public opinion can
also disserve constitutional values, including the rule of law. Moreover,
given the frequency with which the public has no clear constitutional view
on an issue, the limited competence of judges to gauge public opinion, and
the likelihood that considerations rooted in other authorities like text and
precedent will outweigh public opinion in particular cases, public opinion
should rarely change a constitutional outcome. But the foregoing caveats do
not cover all circumstances. After all, the consequentialist, backlash-fearing
argument, which persuades many theorists that judges should sometimes stop
short of what the law truly demands, presumes that there are cases in which
the public has a view different from that of the judges, that judges are aware
of the divergence, and that judges should alter their behaviour accordingly.5
If there are in fact cases where these conditions obtain, it may be better to
think of the public's strongly held view as one of the elements constituting
the right answer rather than as something with which the right answer must
compromise.
In Part II of this article, I briefly describe the epistemic and consequentialist
reasons for judicial deference to strong public opinion. In Part III, I describe
the constitutive reason. Then, in Part IV, I suggest that the status of strong
public opinion as a potential authority in constitutional adjudication reflects
a difference between constitutional law and other legal domains. Specifically,
the difference reflects constitutional law's distinctive need, or at least its
heightened need, to negotiate the constant tension between democracy and
the rule of law. That negotiation requires constitutional judges to exercise a
kind of double-consciousness. In appropriate cases, what the public thinks the
answer to a constitutional question is should inform a judge's own view of the
right answer.
4 That set of values is obviously contested, but the fact of contest does not alter the present analysis.
See infra Part III at 8-11. See also Richard Primus, "When Should Original Meanings Matter?"
(forthcoming, Michigan Law Rev. 2008).
5 See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) at 111-98 (describing the "passive virtues") [Bickel].
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II. NONCONSTITUTIVE OPINION
The Epistemic Reason
One of the best reasons for judges to pay attention to the views of the
broader public is simple epistemic modesty. No one knows everything,
and everyone makes mistakes. Judges, like other people who need to make
decisions, should accordingly pay attention to the conclusions of other people
who have considered a relevant question and are likely to be correct. And as
famously formalized by Condorcet, there is a set of conditions under which
the very fact that a large majority of people holds a view is evidence that the
view is correct. 6 That said, this idea has important limits. Large groups can
exhibit biases and various other pathologies of judgment, and many questions
are more likely to be answered correctly by small communities of experts than
by the public at large.
It is not necessary here to sort through various kinds of questions that might
be important in constitutional cases and determine which, if any, are more
likely to be answered correctly by the public at large than by other available
sources (like, say, the books in the judge's library, or the report of a special
master). What is important for present purposes is something about the status
of the answers strong public opinion would supply if judges were to consult it.
Specifically, what is important is that the epistemic argument for deference to
public opinion regards public opinion as a possible indicator of, rather than a
constituent factor in, a correct constitutional decision. 7
Suppose, for example, that a judge believes that the constitutionality
of the death penalty turns to some degree on whether the threat of capital
punishment deters homicides. 8 Suppose further that a large majority of the
public believes capital punishment to have significant deterrent value. If
dominant public opinion is correct, the judge who looks to public opinion
as a check on her own intuitions will be well-served. But the deterrent effect
of the death penalty is an empirical question whose answer is independent
6 See Christian List & Robert E. Goodin, "Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet
Jury Theorem" (2001) 9 J. of Political Philosophy 277 at 283-88.
7 Often, epistemic concerns would direct deference not to public opinion at large but to the
collective opinion of a community with relevant expertise. Whether the opinion consulted is
expert opinion or general public opinion, however, the gist of the matter is the same for the
present purpose of contrasting an epistemic approach to deference with a constitutive approach.
Expert opinion can help identify, but does not help constitute, correct legal answers.
8 This is one of Sunstein's own examples. See Sunstein, supra note 1.
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of the public's collective guess. Accordingly, a judge who knew the public to
be mistaken about the deterrent effects of the death penalty would have no
epistemic reason to consider the public's view. What matters in this judge's
jurisprudential framework is whether the death penalty actually is a deterrent.
Whether the public believes it to be a deterrent matters only insofar as it assists
the judge in figuring out whether it really is a deterrent or not.
The Consequentialist Reason
Now consider a different way in which judges might factor public opinion
into their decisions. Suppose that the Constitution, properly understood,
forbids the state to prohibit marriages between persons of different races, or
between persons of the same sex. Suppose further that judges believe that
a judicial attempt to enforce what the Constitution requires would lead to
noncompliance, erosion of respect for the law, or violence. In varying ways,
different theorists have argued that it might make sense for judges to avoid the
social costs of confrontation by declining to rule in accordance with their own
best sense of what the Constitution requires.9
This analysis takes it as given that the public's view is inferior to the judges'
as a matter of constitutional law.1" The Constitution requires X, and the judges
know that the Constitution requires X, but the judges also know (or at least
confidently believe) that the public strongly opposes it. Maybe the public does
not care that X is constitutionally required, or maybe the public believes that
the judges are wrong as a matter of constitutional law. But if the public holds
that latter view, it errs. By hypothesis, the situation we now consider is one in
which, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, the judges are right and the
9 See Bickel, supra note 4 at 174 (discussing several examples including that of antimiscegenation
statutes); see also Lawrence Gene Sager, "Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms" (1978) 91 Harvard Law Rev. 1212 (arguing that in light of the
institutional limitations on courts, judges should sometimes stop short of enforcing the full extent
of constitutional law).
10 Here and at several other junctures, I write as if I were making heroic assumptions about
the public's having a constitutional view or about how it arrives at that view (or, if there is a
difference, about the reasons why it holds a view). I do not actually intend to endorse these
assumptions. As I noted earlier, the formation of constitutional views among the public at large
rarely proceeds by reflective processes like those that we associate with idealized or self-conscious
methods of reasoning. See supra note 3. Indeed, as I discuss in infra Part III at 11-15, it is rarely
coherent to attribute a constitutional view to "the public." Even more rarely does the public hold
a constitutional view because it endorses some particular course of reasoning supporting the
conclusion. Nonetheless, I sometimes write as if the public did hold a constitutional view as a
result of an analytic reasoning process. My argument should not be affected by the unlikelihood
of these conditions because the point each time is to engage in a thought experiment about the
status of such a public view.
Review of Constitutional Studies/Revue d'itudes constitutionnelles
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public is wrong. The hard question in this scenario is what the judges should
do in the face of misguided but powerful public opposition.
Insofar as the reasons for paying attention to public opinion are epistemic,
judges should ignore public opinion when that opinion is wrong. But if the
concern is consequentialist, then powerful public opposition can supply reasons
in the decision-making process even when the public errs. Suppose that the
public firmly and fiercely believes that the death penalty is a constitutionally
appropriate form of punishment because it deters homicides. Suppose also that
a judge knows, confidently and correctly, that capital punishment actually has
no such deterrent effect. In this scenario, it makes no sense for the judge to
take the public's belief that capital punishment deters homicide into account
when considering how the deterrent value of capital punishment bears on
the constitutionally correct decision. But the fact that the public has reached
its constitutional view erroneously is irrelevant when the judge asks himself
whether declaring the death penalty unconstitutional would provoke a violent
backlash. If the judge's reason for tempering his ruling is the wish to avoid
violence, then he should take the public's opposition into account even though
the public's constitutional reasoning is inferior to his own.
The epistemic-modesty reason for consulting public opinion supplies reasons
for judicial action only to the degree that public opinion might point to factually
true propositions. The consequentialist reason, by contrast, describes a way in
which strong public opinion can provide a reason for judicial action irrespective
of its truth-value. Note, however, that when judges consider public opinion in
this latter vein, they are deciding whether to depart from the constitutionally
correct answer in light of extra-constitutional considerations. They already
know the right answer: the right answer, as a matter of constitutional law, is that
capital punishment in the present hypothetical scenario is unconstitutional.
The question is whether recalcitrant public opinion should prevent them from
enforcing that right answer.
III. CONSTITUTIVE OPINION
I suggest that strong public opinion can play a third role. In some cases, the fact
that the public holds a given view can be a constituent factor in constitutional
analysis. In other words, the public's belief that X is constitutional can be a
reason why X really is constitutional, just as a clause or a judicial precedent
can be such a reason. The public's belief in such a case is neither an indicator
of the correct answer nor a condition with which the right answer must come
Volume 13, Issue 1, 2007
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to terms. It is one of several factors that together constitute the right answer.
I expect this claim to be controversial. Many of us have the intuition
that law, and especially constitutional law, should not bend and sway with
public opinion. To a considerable extent that intuition is warranted, and I
am certainly not arguing that judges should decide constitutional cases in
accordance with whatever the majority of people wants. I am arguing that
if we think carefully about what makes something a valid consideration in
deciding a constitutional case, we should conclude that strong public opinion
fits the criteria about as well as some other interpretive tools that are widely
accepted elements of constitutional adjudication. It is, therefore, hard to see
why public opinion should be categorically excluded from the calculus. All
things considered, public opinion may bear on few litigated questions, and
even on those questions, it will be a decisive factor in even fewer. But it will
sometimes have a role.
First- and Second-Order Authority
The possibility that the public's view on a question can help constitute the
right answer to that question should be familiar in various non-legal contexts.
In the television game of Family Feud, for example, where a contestant tries
to guess the most popular response to a question, the right answer clearly
depends on the choices that other people have made. The same is true in any
number of coordination games." In these situations, the subjective choices of
many different people together create an objectively best answer, or even an
objectively correct one.
Several constitutional doctrines often reproduce this phenomenon.
One thing a court might be doing when it asks whether a defendant has a
reasonable expectation of privacy is asking whether most people would have
expected privacy under a given set of circumstances. 2 One way to decide
whether a punishment is cruel or unusual is to ask whether most people would
deem it so.3 One way to decide whether printed matter is obscene is to apply
11 A famous example involves asking people in New Haven, Connecticut where they would try to
meet a friend in New York City, if the two friends trying to meet had no way to communicate
with one another. A large majority of respondents chose the information booth in Grand Central
Station. That location is therefore the right answer; precisely because it is the location that
most people would try, it is the location where one friend is most likely to find the other. This
example and several terrific others are described in Thomas C. Schelling, 7he Strategy of Conflict
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963) at 55-57.
12 See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1990).
13 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 451 (2005); Cf. Barry Friedman, "Dialogue and Judicial Review"
Review of Constitutional Studies/Revue d'itudes constitutionnelles
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a community standards test.14 To be sure, judges might mistake their own
senses of privacy, cruelty, or obscenity for those of the community. But the
aspiration to track the community's standards shows that the law can make its
requirements depend on what the public thinks.
In the foregoing examples, public opinion helps constitute, rather than
simply indicate, the content of constitutional law. Crucially, however, it does
not play that constituent role by virtue of some independent authority that it
has as public opinion. Instead, it shapes constitutional law at the invitation
of another form of constitutional authority like text or judicial doctrine. For
example, judges who consult strong public opinion to give content to the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the United States Constitution
are acting on the authority of the text of the Eighth Amendment. That text,
as they understand it, directs them to consult public opinion, and public
opinion is salient only because the text makes it so.15 Public opinion here is
a constituent factor in constitutional adjudication, but it is a second-order
constituent factor.
I suggest that strong public opinion should sometimes be regarded as
a first-order constituent factor. Where applicable-and I have more to say
shortly about where that is-the views of the demos should be treated as
a source of reasons in constitutional adjudication independently of whether
textual, precedential, or some other kind of constitutional authority calls for
the inclusion of those views. Public opinion here stands on its own bottom.
Just as precedent is entitled to weight even though no constitutional text
directs judges to consult precedent, strong public opinion-in cases where
it has something to say-is entitled to weight even when no other form of
constitutional authority so provides.
Criteria for Constitutional Authority
The reason why strong public opinion should have independent status as a
source of authority in constitutional reasoning is, in essence, the same as the
reason why text, precedent, and other familiar sources of authority properly
(1993) 91 Michigan Law Rev. 577 at 596-97, 602 & note 119.
14 See Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915 (1974).
15 If instead of prohibiting "cruel and unusual" punishments, the text said "Those punishments that
may be inflicted are those that were practiced in Virginia in 1789," public opinion would be of no
consequence. (I omit prolonged consideration of whether a judge in the latter case would need
to consult public opinion to determine the meaning of terms like "Virginia" or "1789." There is a
sense in which such consideration would be necessary, but it is very close to the sense in which the
interpretation of all language requires recourse to public opinion all the time).
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have that status. Simply put, treating them as sources of authority shows
respect for the values that should guide constitutional adjudication. Why, for
example, does it make sense to treat the text of constitutional clauses as sources
of authority? Because, depending on the circumstances, attention to the text
can vindicate democratic decision making, uphold the rule of law, and, to
the extent that citizens conceive of constitutional adjudication as a text-based
practice, strengthen the public's identification with the governing regime,
thus fostering the legitimacy of the constitutional system. 6 Democracy, the
rule of law, and public identification with the regime are not the only values
that should guide constitutional interpretation, but they are certainly in the
set. By the same token, the reason that textual authority is only one of several
factors in constitutional adjudication, rather than being the sole source of
authority on all constitutional questions, is that textual interpretation is not
always the best way to serve all of the constitutional values that bear on a given
question.
The values that should animate constitutional adjudication are obviously
contested, and at two levels. First, there is no generally accepted list of
constitutional values. Second, even if there were such a list, people would
disagree about the content of many, or all, of the values in the set. It is still
the case, however, that the appropriate way to justify the use of any particular
adjudicative method in constitutional law is by reference to an underlying
constitutional value, and indeed defences of particular methods are routinely
offered in just that way. Many originalists, for example, argue that originalism
respects democratic decision making, which is a constitutional value. The fact
that the content of "democracy" is contested means that it is not always simple
to decide whether a particular decision-making method serves that value, and
the fact that there is no closed list of constitutional values complicates the
picture further. But there are also areas of relative consensus. Virtually all
American constitutional lawyers, for example, believe that democracy, the rule
of law, and public identification with the regime-on some understanding of
those concepts-are constitutional values. Moreover, almost everyone agrees
that certain procedures respect democracy (holding elections comes to mind)
and that others do not (say, adhering to the preferences of the tallest person
in town). To be sure, saying that something is a valid source of authority
in constitutional adjudication if treating it as such vindicates underlying
16 On the capacity of text-based interpretation to uphold democracy and the rule of law, see Antonin
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). On the idea of
constitutional interpretation as a text-based social practice, see Keith Whittington, "The New
Originalism" (2004) 2 Georgetown J. of Law & Public Policy 599 at 613 & note 61 (attributing
the phrase to Howard Gillman).
Review of Constitutional Studies/Revue d'etudes constitutionnelles
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constitutional values leaves many questions open. But they are the right
questions. And sometimes, it is possible to answer them.17
Within this understanding of what makes something a source of consti-
tutional authority, strong public opinion seems to qualify. Indeed, in cases
where it is meaningful to say that the public has a clear and strongly held view,
treating that view as a source of authority serves some of the same underlying
values that attention to constitutional text sometimes can. Most obviously,
keeping the content of constitutional law aligned with the public's strongly
held views helps maintain the public's identification with the governing re-
gime, thus supporting the legitimacy of the constitutional system. Treating
the public's view as a factor in constitutional adjudication can also show re-
spect for the value of democracy, if not quite for the value of democratic deci-
sion making. Finally, avoiding a showdown between the judicially interpreted
Constitution and an angry public can help preserve the rule of law.18 Indeed,
the fear of damaging the rule of law is much of what motivates those theorists
who advocate the passive virtues in cases where judicial opinion about what
the Constitution requires departs significantly from what the public is willing
to bear.
Public opinion will rarely, if ever, be the best guide to serving the whole set of
values that should underlie constitutional adjudication. On the contrary, too
much or the wrong kind of attention to public opinion would undermine some
of those values. Notably, constitutional decision making that was overly driven
by popular whim would eviscerate the rule of law. But the fact that attention
to public opinion can disserve constitutional values cannot mean that public
opinion should be excluded from constitutional adjudication entirely, because
every source of constitutional authority comes with that hazard. Sometimes
following precedent yields undemocratic decisions, and sometimes following
text would yield decisions that destabilize our institutions. Accordingly, the
practice of constitutional adjudication does not blindly follow any given source
of authority in every case. Instead, judges should ask in each case whether this
or that source of authority, if consulted, would serve or disserve the values
that should guide constitutional adjudication. Sometimes, attention to strong
public opinion can help to vindicate those constitutional values. In such cases,
public opinion should be a factor in judicial decision making just like, and
for the same reasons as, text, precedent, and the other established sources of
17 For an expanded analysis of these issues and an attempt to resolve at least some of them, see
Richard Primus, supra note 4.
18 It could also undermine the rule of law. See infra Part III at 15-18.
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constitutional authority.
Public Opinion and Democratic Legitimacy
A sceptic who agreed that constitutional adjudication should respect and
foster democratic legitimacy might here interject that charging judges with
incorporating public opinion into their decision-making methods is a terrible
way to operationalize the value of democracy. The better course, the sceptic's
objection might run, is to let the public shape the Constitution through
formal democratic processes. To be sure, those formal processes are crucial
to constitutional law, and I am not recommending that judges try to replace
them with their own guesses about public opinion. But the formal processes
are not able, or at least not always able, to do the necessary democratic work.
When they are not, it is appropriate to seek other means.
The crudest form of the formal-process argument holds that the people
express themselves democratically through the constitutional amendment
process, such that judges respect democracy by following the enacted text as
understood by the ratifying public.19 The controversy over this claim is wide
and deep.2 ° Very briefly, however, this line of thinking makes no sense when the
relevant constitutional amendment process is too cumbersome to be a reliable
transmitter of popular will. One need not confuse democratic legitimacy with
simple majoritarianism to recognize that some formal amendment processes
are too demanding to let failure to amend the Constitution stand for popular
satisfaction with the status quo. (Imagine a constitutional amendment process
requiring a unanimous vote of all citizens to amend the Constitution. Now
imagine a process requiring a 99 percent supermajority, and so on.) The
formal rules of Article V of the U.S. Constitution, for example, furnish an
extreme example of a cumbersome amendment process. It is among the most
cumbersome of any extant national constitution,2' and it is certainly too
19 For one significant articulation of this position, see U.S., Department of Justice, Office of Legal
Policy, Guidelines on Constitutional Interpretation (1988).
20 See Keith Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, &Judicial
Review (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999); Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding" (1980) 60 Boston Univ. Law Rev. 204. These are the tip of an
iceberg, but they are as good a tip as any.
21 See Donald S. Lutz, "Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in Responding to
Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment" in Sanford Levinson, ed.,
Our Undemocratic Constitution : Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We The People
Can Correct It) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 261 (arguing, based on a proposed
mathematical model, that the United States Constitution was the second-most difficult to amend
of 30 national constitutions studied as of 1992).
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cumbersome for the formal-process argument to make sense in the American
context. 22
A less crude version of the argument that formal democratic mechanisms
already shape constitutional adjudication points out that judges are chosen by
elected officials. For this reason, the social and political views of the judiciary
rarely stray far from those of the dominant political coalition, which is itself a
crude, but not terrible, proxy for the public. 23 To the extent that the judiciary
shares the political values of the public, it will vindicate public opinion without
even trying. This idea is more plausible.2 4 It would be overly sanguine, however,
to expect the judiciary's collective constitutional vision always to match that of
the whole polity. Indeed, all discussion of what judges should do when faced
with the prospect of serious public disapproval relies on the potential for there
to be a gap between the public's view and the judiciary's, which sometimes
there certainly is. The real question, then, is whether conscious attention to
strong public opinion can better vindicate democratic values in constitutional
decision making than would trusting to the foregoing mechanisms alone. I
believe that it can, even if only sometimes.
The qualification "sometimes" is crucial. For one thing, it is only sometimes
sensible to say that the public has a view on a given constitutional issue. Most
individual citizens have no real view about most issues that constitutional
courts adjudicate. For example, it is safe to bet that few Americans have
considered and strongly held positions on whether local flow-control ordinances
are dormant commerce violations. 25 At the same time, at the collective level,
polities are composed of millions of people who, if they have a view at all, are
bound to disagree with one another. Unless one means to take any majority or
plurality view for the voice of the people, public opinion is usually too divided
to direct a unique result in a constitutional case. For all of these reasons,
trying to adjudicate most constitutional questions by consulting the views of
the polity is like trying to adjudicate the limits of the United States Congress's
Article I powers by reference to the text of the Twenty-Second Amendment:
the source can yield no answer.
22 See Henry Paul Monaghan, "Doing Originalism" (2004) 104 Columbia Law Rev. 32 at 35
(describing the Constitution as "practically unamendable").
23 See Robert Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policy-
Maker" (1958) 6 J. of Public Law 279 at 285.
24 See generally Barry Friedman, "The Politics ofJudicial Review" (2005) 84 Texas Law Rev. 257;
Richard A. Primus, "Boiling Alone" (2004) 104 Columbia Law Rev. 975; Michael J. Klarman,
"Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History" (2001) 89 California Law Rev. 1721
at 1749-50.
25 See UnitedHaulersAss'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid WasteMngmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007).
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In some cases, however, a constitutional opinion can be held by a broad
enough swath of the polity, and held with sufficient confidence and tenacity,
to make it sensible to say that it is the public's view. I assume, for example,
that the American public would oppose a bid by the federal government to
declare Buddhism the nation's established religion or to replace all locally
elected officials with people chosen by the Vice-President. Thirty years ago,
the public would have similarly opposed a constitutional decision forbidding
sex discrimination in the provision of marriage licenses. To return again to
the analogy with textual interpretation, the fact that there are many questions
that cannot be settled by reference to public opinion does not mean that
public opinion never points toward a particular resolution of a constitutional
question, just as the fact that the constitutional text leaves many questions
unaddressed does not prevent text from pointing towards particular answers
on many other questions.
Next, there is a question of institutional competence. Even when it would
be sensible to say that the public has a view, judges have no special capability
to discern it. As Justice Black once quipped, the United States Supreme Court
lacks the means to commission a poll 26 (though I presume judges are also
no less able to read polling data than other people are). Worse, judges might
mistake their own views for those of reasonable people everywhere. If so,
judges trying in good faith to treat public opinion as a source of authority
might in practice just enact their own predilections. 27
This problem with judicial competence, however, is not unique to adjudica-
tion based on public opinion. It also afflicts a fair amount of constitutional
reasoning that looks to other and long-accepted sources of authority. Perhaps
the best example comes from judicial uses of historical argument. Almost
without exception, neither judges nor their clerks are trained in historical
method, and judicial opinions (and briefs, and law-review articles) regularly
contain arguments about the past that could not be taken seriously if mea-
sured by the standards of professional historians. 28
26 See Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 519 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
27 It is also likely that at least some judges (and other people) overestimate the difference between
their own views and those of the public. Many people exaggerate both their own enlightenment
and the average person's benightedness, and judges are not immune from these tendencies. A
judge in this position might well be led into the opposite error by allowing considerations of
public opinion to enter into his deliberations: rather than giving too much weight to his own
views, he might shrink more than is appropriate from ruling in accordance with his own best
understanding of a case. Somehow, though, this possibility worries me less than the prospect of
judges too quickly eliding the differences between their own views and the views of the people.
28 See Larry D. Kramer, "When Lawyers Do History" (2003) 72 George Washington Law Rev. 387.
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Should constitutional law, therefore, exclude history as a source of authority?
Almost no one takes this view, and properly not. What follows from the
unfortunate fact of judges' limited competence as historians is not that
constitutional adjudication should give up on historical argument entirely,
but rather that judges should be careful and modest about their historical
claims. Judges should strive to understand a little bit about critical historical
thinking, and they should remain aware of their limited competence and of
the inability of history as such to resolve many questions, and they should
strive to avoid resting too heavily on uncertain historical ground.
The same can be true for the influence of public opinion. There is no reason,
after all, to believe that judges are inherently less capable of thinking critically
about public opinion than they are of thinking critically about history. Most
of the time, judges' healthy awareness of the limits of their own knowledge of
public opinion should prevent it from weighing too heavily in the disposition
of a case. But when judges confidently and correctly know something about a
strongly held view in the polity, that view could be part of the constitutional
calculus.
Finally, it is important to remember that letting a factor be part of the
constitutional calculus, or treating something as one of the sources of
constitutional authority, is not the same thing as being governed by that factor
or that authority even in the face of good countervailing reasons. Nothing
in my argument means that judges should simply decide cases in line with
dominant public opinion. This is not merely because there is no dominant
public opinion on many issues, nor is it only because judges may not be able to
discern dominant public opinion where it exists. It is also because even when
judges can discern that public opinion strongly favours ruling X, other sources
of constitutional authority may yield stronger reasons for ruling not-X.
All of those qualifications, however, apply to every other source of
constitutional authority as well. Neither text, nor precedent, nor history,
nor anything else speaks clearly and univocally to every constitutional issue.
Much less does any such source determine right answers regardless of what
all the other sources of authority have to say. What follows is that no single
source of authority should decide every case. Just as obviously, it follows that
a potential source of authority must not be entirely excluded if it comes with
the foregoing problems.
Given all these considerations, judicial attention to public opinion will often
be a bad way to vindicate the democratic values of constitutionalism. Rarely, I
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would think, should it be a decisive factor in constitutional decision making.
But in those circumstances where paying attention to strong public opinion
would do the job of showing proper respect for democracy, public opinion
should be regarded as one source of constitutive constitutional authority.
Public Opinion and the Rule of Law
The rule of law, like democratic legitimacy, is one of the values that should
guide constitutional adjudication. Rule-of-law concerns help justify treating
well-accepted sources of constitutional authority, like text and precedent, as
constitutional authorities: under appropriate circumstances, looking for guid-
ance to text and precedent can vindicate and enhance the rule of law. And
under appropriate circumstances, the rule of law can also be served by looking
to strong public opinion.
Clearly, consulting public opinion as part of the constitutional reasoning
process could easily betray the rule of law as well. Part of the aspiration of the
rule of law is government by stable, impersonal norms that do not vary with
passing fads or with the popularity of particular litigants. But the rule of law
is the name for a complex cluster of contested values,29 and the relationship
of this cluster to public opinion is multifaceted. For one thing, the rule of
law does not require that law ignore popular opinion entirely. No one thinks
that the use of reasonableness standards is contrary to the rule of law, even
though such standards often look to community beliefs and practices for their
content. (This is one important limitation on the idea that the rule of law
means a law of rules.3 0 )
One component of the rule of law is public willingness to respect and obey
legal institutions, and legal institutions can jeopardize that willingness by
making demands that the public finds intolerable. This tension is precisely
what underlies the consequentialist or passive-virtue reasons for which judges
might take strong public opinion into account. 3' Within the consequentialist
paradigm, a judge might hold back from doing what the law directs, thus
compromising the rule of law in a particular case, in order to maintain the
judiciary's standing with the public and thus preserve the rule of law more
broadly. Perhaps such a choice should be regarded as a net loss for the rule
29 See generally Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) at 210-
19; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "'The Rule of Law' as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse" (1997)
97 Columbia Law Rev. 1.
30 Antonin Scalia, "The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules" (1989) 56 Univ. of Chicago Law Rev. 1175.
31 Bickel, supra note 5.
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of law, but, depending on the circumstances, it might not be. Moreover, that
calculus supplies a standard for the judge who must ask how much of the
public must hold a view, and how fiercely the view must be held, for that view
to figure in her considerations. The answer is "enough to do damage to the
rule of law."
To be sure, there is reason for scepticism about whether judges can reliably
predict the degree to which public reaction to their decisions will undermine
the rule of law. Forecasting public behaviour is difficult, and judges might
have to fight some structural biases in the attempt. For example, judges are
much more aware of judicial activity than ordinary citizens, and judges who
overestimate the attention that people are paying to the courts could easily
overestimate the social disorder that unpopular rulings would provoke.
Similarly, judges may overestimate both the need for courts to protect civil
peace and their capacity to keep that peace when it is truly threatened. Bush
v. Gore2 may be an example of the former pathology: many defences of that
decision stress the need to head off chaos,33 but the price of milk did not rise
in November and December of 2000. The famous story of the Warren Court's
effort to secure unanimity in Brown v. Board of Education3" may illustrate the
second: given the massive and often violent resistance to desegregation, one
wonders how much the Court actually bought with its statesmanship in that
case.
These worries, however, apply to the consequentialist reason for taking
strong public opinion into account just as well as they apply to the constitutive
reason. 35 Whether they mean that judges should never be sufficiently confident
in their reading of public opinion as to let such considerations inform their
constitutional decision making is not a question that I propose to settle
here. My point is merely that if there are circumstances in which rule-of-
32 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
33 See Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, the Constitution, and the Courts
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) ("The decision averted what might well have been
(though the Pollyannas deny this) a political and constitutional crisis").
34 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For an account of the Court's efforts to
present a unanimous front in Brown, see Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v.
Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality (New York: Knopf, 1976) at 678-99.
35 It is here important to clarify that the contrast between "consequentialist" and "constitutive"
reasons for attention to public opinion does not mean that nothing about the "constitutive"
reason can be concerned with consequences. As the present discussion of the rule of law suggests,
sometimes the constitutive analysis is concerned with consequences: a concern about public
backlash is a concern about a potential consequence. What the contrast is supposed to highlight
is that the "consequentialist" approach, as Sunstein uses the term, is about consequences that are
supposed to be external to the process of constitutional reasoning itself.
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law considerations should bring judges to consider strong public opinion,
we should regard that consideration as internal to the process of making
the right constitutional decision, not as a compromise requiring a departure
from the right decision. After all, the rule of law is a legitimate and a routine
consideration within the process of constitutional adjudication.
It should not be hard to see that rule-of-law concerns routinely enjoy that
status. Consider three cases in which a judge's decision could be affected by
rule-of-law considerations. In the first case, a judge fears civil unrest if he holds
the highly popular Widget Act unconstitutional. In the second case, a judge
thinks that textual and structural considerations support striking down the
Widget Act, but she knows that such a holding would require her to overrule
Smith v. Jones, which is regarded as settled precedent. And in the third case, a
judge thinks that structure and precedent support striking down the Widget
Act but that on a proper reading of constitutional text, the Act is valid. In each
of these three cases, concern for the rule of law might persuade the judge to
uphold the Widget Act: in the first case to avoid unrest, in the second case to
respect stare decisis, and in the third case to vindicate the authority of the duly
enacted Constitution.
If a judge were to give decisive weight to the constitutional text in the third
case, we would not say that he had compromised the right constitutional
answer in light of rule-of-law considerations. We would instead say that the
judge had considered the relevant set of authorities and arrived at what he
believed to be the best constitutional answer. If a judge were to give decisive
weight to precedent in the second case, some critics of stare decisis would say
that the judge had departed from the truly correct constitutional answer,36 but
few constitutional lawyers share that view. Instead, most of us would say that
the judge in the second case had properly considered precedent as a source
of constitutional authority, just as the judge in the first case had properly
considered text. So why, in the third case, would it be a departure from the
right constitutional answer, rather than a step toward finding it, if a judge
were to value the rule of law by considering strong public opinion, rather than
text or precedent?
The answer, if there is one, can only be that text and precedent just are
appropriate sources of legal authority, and public opinion just isn't. But that
is a hard proposition to support with reasoned argument. Note first that the
claim derives rhetorical power from its categorical confidence, but it must
36 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, "The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent" (2005) 22
Constitutional Commentary 289 at 298 ("A doctrine of stare decisis always works in opposition to
correct interpretation of the Constitution").
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immediately be qualified to take account of the role that strong public
opinion routinely plays as a second-order authority when a decision turns on a
reasonableness or community standards test. More fundamentally, there is no
closed and universally accepted set of authorities in constitutional law. This is
not to say that anything can be a valid factor in constitutional adjudication-
many things, I am sure, cannot. ("This will increase my nephew's wealth"
is not an acceptable consideration.) But excluding something as a potential
source of authority requires a theory of constitutional decision making. Within
the present theory, on which something is a legitimate source of authority in
a given constitutional case if looking to it for reasons will vindicate the values
that properly guide constitutional adjudication, certain limited consultations
of strong public opinion cannot be ruled out.
IV. DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS
I suspect that many readers will still be bothered by the argument of this
essay, because there may seem something distinctly un-law-like in treating
public opinion, even in limited circumstances, as a first-order source of
authority in constitutional adjudication. Perhaps, however, this powerful
intuition points not to an irresolvable conflict but to a paradox in the strict
sense of an apparent contradiction that reflects a deeper truth. Perhaps, I
suggest, the underlying explanation is that constitutional law is not quite like
other forms of law in the relevant sense. If it is not, then criteria that determine
what is "law-like" in other areas might mislead when applied too woodenly in
the constitutional domain.
Consider a contrast with the law of contracts, a field whose interpretive tools
are often (and often too quickly) imported into constitutional law. In some
respects, looking to outside opinion is something that contract law shares with
constitutional law. A contract, like a constitution, can make public opinion
relevant to its construction by so providing in its text. Just as a constitution may
require that searches and seizures be reasonable, a buyer may agree to purchase
100 widgets at a reasonable price, and in each case determinate content comes
from the values and practices of a relevant community. More subtly, a judge
in a contract case might ask what most people would understand by a given
term, or whether reasonable people would agree to a particular arrangement,
if doing so helps to clarify what it was that the parties actually agreed to.
But in the language I used earlier, these are all examples of public opinion as
second-order authority. The first-order authority is the bargain that the parties
to the contract struck. Except to shed light on the intentions or reasonable
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understandings of the parties, public opinion does not bear on the proper
adjudication of contract disputes. No judge would say, nor ought to say, "the
parties expected that the widgets would be delivered in the morning, but the
public overwhelmingly prefers afternoon widget delivery, so I construe the
contract to require delivery in the afternoon."
To be sure, a judge might refuse to enforce a contract providing for morning
widget delivery if the public interest strongly required afternoon deliveries
(e.g., because morning deliveries are a public health hazard). Considerations of
public welfare bound and shape contract law all the time. Public welfare is not,
however, the same thing as public opinion: the judge who would on public-
policy grounds refuse to enforce a contract providing for morning widget
delivery might well do so even if most people had no opinion at all about the
attendant health and safety issues. Similarly, if public opinion were codified
into statutes that require the nullification or reformation of certain contracts,
then there is an attenuated sense in which public opinion shapes contractual
adjudication, but only in the same attenuated sense in which public opinion
eventually figures into every form of law in a democracy. In contrast, public
opinion as such-the uncodified preferences of the demos, not as an epistemic
indicator of justice or sound policy, but simply on its own bottom-is not a
constitutive source of authority in contract adjudication.
Constitutional law is different. The high barriers to modifying its rules
through normal electoral channels make constitutional law sit uneasily
with democratic processes, thus requiring a constant negotiation between
the values of democracy and constitutionalism. And the salience of at least
some constitutional issues makes the need for negotiation hard to ignore.
Democratic legitimacy is not the only value informing constitutional law, but
it is constantly in play in a way that is not replicated in most other fields of
law. The considerations that inform constitutional decision making should
reflect this difference.
This may mean that constitutional law is in some sense less law-like than
some other fields of law. More precisely, it may mean that we take those other
fields as the paradigm defining what "law" is as such. But if so, we should not
be surprised that there are differences between constitutional law and other
domains of law. Constitutional law, especially in the most contested of cases,
is not best described as a species of law on all fours with the construction of
wills or the regulation of corporate securities. If it is less law-like, then it is
also more something else. In a constitutional democracy, that something else
fundamentally involves the attempt to have both democracy and the rule of
Review of Constitutional StudieslRevue d'3tudes constitutionnelles IQ
HeinOnline  -- 13 Rev. Const. Stud. 19 2007-2008
Double- Consciousness in ConstitutionalAdjudication
law at the same time. Hence the occasional need for double-consciousness, as
the judge must make the public's view a factor within her own.
V. CONCLUSION
There are few litigated cases in which it is sensible to say that the public
strongly holds a given constitutional view. There may be fewer still in which
that constitutional view is not already overdetermined as the right answer on
the basis of other, less controversial authorities like text and precedent. But in
constitutional cases where there is such a thing as the polity's view, that view
should be treated as one legitimate source of authority. Nothing is said here
about how to balance this factor against other factors that properly inform
constitutional decision making. That is a separate question and probably one
that needs to be answered in the course of adjudicating particular cases.
The public's view in such cases is not a corrective to the court's view, nor is
it a reason to compromise the correct constitutional answer. It is one of the
elements in the process of proper constitutional adjudication. In cases where
the text of a constitutional clause bears on the question, judges would err if
they arrived at their conclusion without reference to the text; in cases where
strong public opinion bore on the question, judges would err if they arrived at
their conclusions without reference to that opinion. In other words, what the
public thinks in such cases must be part of what judges think. That double-
consciousness is a necessary aspect of constitutional adjudication.
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